Abstract
After becoming consistently more egalitarian for more than two decades, gender role attitudes turned more conservative in the last decade. This shift is consistent with a broader set of changes that may indicate a fundamental alteration in the momentum toward gender equality. Using data from the General Social Survey, this paper describes the trends in gender role attitudes from 1974 to 2004 and then tests competing explanations for the trends. Results show that while cohort replacement can do much to explain the increasing egalitarianism between 1974 and 1994, the reversal of attitudes in the mid-1990s and beyond is not accounted for by cohort differences. Importantly, within-cohorts, individuals have become considerably more conservative since the mid-1990s. These effects are not explained by either structural or broad ideological changes.
The End of the Gender Revolution: Attitudes from 1974 to 2004

Eight years ago at these meetings, Karin Brewster and Irene Padavic presented an analysis of changes in gender attitudes that was guarded but optimistic. They found that while the pace of change towards liberal gender attitudes had slowed, they expected that "the liberalization of gender beliefs has not yet run its course" (see Brewster and Padavic, 2000: 485). Others have echoed that optimism. Clem Brooks and Catherine Bolzendahl open their extensive review of changes in General Social Survey attitudes with an upbeat overview: "Changes in US attitudes toward gender roles during the past three decades have been large and generally monotonic" (Brooks and Bolzendahl, 2003:107). Similarly, Peltola, Millkie and Presser begin their 2004 analysis of feminist identities with the familiar observation that "Americans' attitudes about women's rights and roles have become significantly more liberal during the past half century."

That is no longer true. In the mid-1990s gender attitudes ceased their steady climb towards greater liberalism. Recorded levels in the first decade of this century are now below the results of the peak of the previous decade (see Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman, 2004:27). Brewster and Padavic's worst fears seem to have come true: "Although the strong influence of cohort succession suggests that the trend toward more egalitarian attitudes will continue, ... we are not entirely sanguine about the egalitarian nature of future attitude shifts" (486).

In this paper we show that despite continuing cohort replacement pressure towards more liberal positions, gender attitudes have become significantly more conservative since the mid 1990s. This conservative period effect can be observed within almost all cohorts, across both men and women of all ethnicities and all levels of education. Moreover, there is no readily identifiable social structural cause to the 1990s reversal. While several background factors can help explain the rise of liberal attitudes throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the decline since the mid 1990s is robust to all controls. Nor does the change in gender attitudes appear to be part of a broader period shift towards more conservative political and family attitudes.

The decline in egalitarian gender attitudes is part of a broader pattern of the mid 1990s that marked the end of the gender revolution. Married mothers' labor force participation began to decline about the same time. Women's entry into previously male occupations also ended in the 1990s. Even women's political office holding seems to have
The End of the Gender Revolution

peaked in that decade. The gender gap in earnings which had been narrowing since the late 1970s stopped changing in the 1990s (although the gap may have declined again in the last few years). Of all the major indicators of gender inequality, only educational differences seem to have been unaffected by the turnaround of the 1990s (see Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman, 2004, for a review of this evidence).

The breadth of these changes and the lack of an easily identifiable structural cause to the attitude changes, suggests an important cultural shift may have occurred in the 1990s. There is much supportive evidence for such an interpretation. Susan Douglas and Meredith Michaels (2004) have argued that the idealization of the "Mommy Myth" has undermined gender equality in recent years. The growth of "intensive mothering" (Hays, 1996) has put enormous pressures on women to choose between careers and motherhood (Blair-Loy, 2004). And the media have been quick, some would say too quick (Pollitt, 2003), to document any reversals in feminist commitment (Belkin, 2003).

Nevertheless, it is not immediately clear why the 1990s should have been any more conservative than the 1980s. Susan Faludi wrote Backlash about the anti-feminist movements of the 1980s, a decade when virtually all gender indicators continued to progress towards more equality. Why should these reactions suddenly start to have a conservative impact in the mid 1990s after years of repetition? The last two decades of cultural analyses suggest an interesting range of reactions to feminism over the last quarter century, but we need a more systematic investigation in order to chart the rise and fall of various media and political trends. We do not undertake such an enterprise here. But given the attitude shifts documented in this paper, more attention to cultural changes are certainly in order.

BACKGROUND

Several types of factors have been suggested as causes of the liberalizing gender trends in the 1970s and 1980s. Among the most common are:

- cohort replacement of early conservative cohorts by recent liberal cohorts,
- social structural changes such as increasing education and declining fertility,
- the entry of women into the labor force,
- a liberalizing ideological climate that supported more egalitarian attitudes on many issues,
The End of the Gender Revolution

and

$\text{the rise of the second wave of the women's movement.}$

Each of these can plausibly be amended to explain a downturn in the 1990s. Moreover, empirical tests for several of these are readily available with existing survey data.

_Cohort replacement_. Much of the attitude changes towards greater liberalism observed in the GSS can be attributed to a cohort replacement effect (Davis, 1992). Cohorts born since 1945 are generally more liberal than cohorts born before. Both Brewster and Padavic (2000) and Brooks and Bolzendahl (2004) found these strong cohort effects on gender attitudes. Brooks and Bolzendahl estimate that 55% of the 1985-1998 changes are a result of the more liberal recent cohorts replacing the earlier more conservative cohorts.

However, cohort differences have been decelerating since the 1945 birth cohort. There are only small differences separating the most recent cohorts from those born 30 years earlier. While the popular press sometimes reports a reversal among "Generation Y", survey evidence suggests that the recent cohorts are still more liberal than all their predecessors; what has changed is that the differences are now quite small. With the narrowing of the cohort differences after 1945, the cohort replacement effect has become less dramatic (Brewster and Padavic, 2000). This could explain why gender attitudes stopped liberalizing so fast in recent years, but they cannot account for the mid-1990s reversal. Unless there has been a true reversal in the cohort differences, we do not expect the cohort effects to explain much of the 1990s change in the trend.

_Social structural changes_. Educational, family, and economic changes remade American society in the last half of the twentieth century. Several of these changes have good theoretical and empirical support as causal factors in the rise of gender liberalism in the 1970s and 1980s. For some, it is possible that the pace of structural change slowed (e.g., for education) or even reversed at the end of the century and, so, might account for a turnaround in gender attitudes.

Similarly, the 1990s were one of the first periods in recent times in which men's earnings rose, pushing up average family incomes for the first time since the 1960s. The broader affluence of the 1990s might have reduced the pressure for wives' employment and re-emphasized the virtues of mothers remaining at home to care for the family.

Other trends should have pushed gender attitudes in a more conservative direction throughout the last
The End of the Gender Revolution

quarter of the twentieth century. Several studies have showed that more fundamentalist and evangelical religions tend to support a more conservative gender ideology (Bolzendahl and Brooks, 2005; Moore and Vanneman, 2003). The shift away from mainline Protestant denominations towards these more conservative Protestants in the last half of the century should have at least slowed the 1970s and 1980s trend towards more liberal gender attitudes. If this religious shift had accelerated recently, it might account for a 1990s reversal in gender attitudes. However, the evidence is that these religious shifts may have actually slowed in recent years, not accelerated, so it seems unlikely that they can explain the 1990s gender turnaround.

Women's labor force participation. The long rise in women's actual labor force participation rates seems an obvious source of support for the rise in public approval for women's employment. Of course, it is especially difficult to separate cause and effect here since the attitudes changes could just as well have propelled more women into employed work.

Nevertheless, the labor force participation explanation is especially important to evaluate since we know that married mothers' employment, which had been increasing steadily, began to decline about the same time that the attitudes trends also changed. With the GSS repeated cross-sections, there is little chance of eliminating the endogeneity of women's actual labor force participation. But we should test for its possible role, suspending for the moment any definitive causal interpretation, in order to see if even the association of women's work and gender attitudes might account for much of the 1990s turnaround.

Ideological climate. Brooks and Bolzendahl (2004) find that the cohort and period shifts toward liberal gender attitudes are associated with similar changes in American's support of a broader "rights-based ideology". Of course, endogeneity is again a problem with this analysis since both could plausibly be results of similar causal forces. But it changes our interpretation of the gender trends to understand that they are part of a larger ideological shift and not a uniquely gender-based transformation. So it is worthwhile testing whether the 1990s turnaround in gender attitudes was also part of a larger transition in Americans' ideology that occurred at the same time. We are unsure why the 1990s would be a turning point in this broader ideology, but it would change our search for causes to know that it was not just gender attitudes but general social liberal ideology that changed at that time.

Women's movement. Ferree's (1974) original argument was that the shift in more liberal gender attitudes was
particular to gender. Looking at the responses to whether Americans would vote for a well-qualified woman for
President, she observed that while similar attitudes about Catholics, Jews, and Blacks had been changing slowly for
some time, the acceptance of a female Presidential candidate only changed with the onset of the women's movement.
Her interpretation anchored the attitude changes in actual events in American society and not in the background or
ideological characteristics of Americans themselves.

This is a difficult argument to test quantitatively since it is, in effect, an argument based on residuals. If we
are unable to find any characteristics of the sample respondents to explain the shift in attitudes, then we need to
look to more macro-level changes going on outside the individuals themselves. But it is at least a plausible
explanation for the 1990s reversal in gender attitudes. Although the timing appears somewhat delayed, there is
general consensus that a significant backlash to feminism developed in politics and the popular culture at the end of
the century. Why and how this happened is still much debated but it is clear that the 1970s era of an almost
unchallenged feminist insurgency has come to an end. This backlash in the popular culture and in contentious
politics may be the best remaining explanation for the 1990s attitude reversal, even if it is an explanation based on the
unexplained residual.

METHODS

Data. We use the General Social Survey (GSS) data to analyze changes in gender attitudes as have most
such analyses over the last two decades (Mason and Lu, 1988). The GSS has asked eight questions about gender
role attitudes, but only for eleven surveys between 1977 and 1998 were all eight questions asked. For five other
surveys between 1974 and 1983, only four of these questions were asked. For the three surveys since 2000, again
only four gender questions were asked, but not the same four as between 1974 and 1983.

Variables. Gender attitude scale. To track changes over time, we would like to use as many years of data as
possible. We use two alternative strategies in this analysis; fortunately, both provide very similar answers. The
strategy that maximizes the number of years is to compute standardized scores for each item and take the mean of the
available items. Because some items are more available in early years and others in later years, the means used for the
standardization would be biased by the availability of years. We therefore compute means and standard deviations
for each of the eight items only for the eleven surveys for which all eight items are available. We then use these means and standard deviations to standardize each item for all years, including the years when only three or four items were asked.

Item analysis of these eight items showed that one of the items (FEWORK: "Do you approve or disapprove of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her?") did not scale well with the other seven, so we restricted the scale to the seven other items (see Appendix A). Using the variables standardized by their means for the 13 surveys with all items, we created a scale based on the means of whatever items were available in a survey year. This method provides a scale score for 19 surveys from 1974 to 2004.

Because our main focus is on changes in the last decade, we repeated the analyses with an alternative scale using only the four items that have been asked in 1977 and continuously from 1985 to 2004. This scale has the same items in every year but is available for only 13 surveys and misses some of the detail during the late 1970s and early 1980s. But the results are almost identical so we report here the results for the full seven-item scale.

Cohort and Age. To evaluate the role of cohort replacement, we include controls for year of birth. We have done this in two ways. We begin by including dummy variables for each 10-year cohort, starting in 1885-1894 until those born after 1975. These results suggest a regular pattern of cohort differences that we summarize in a spline function. We also add controls for age, divided into seven dummy variables defining 10 year age ranges.

Social structural controls. We include a range of social structural controls that have been shown in past research to affect gender attitudes. These include sex, race/ethnicity, religious affiliation and participation, income and employment, and marital and parental status.

Ideology. Brooks and Bolzendahl (2004) find that the growing liberalism of gender attitudes is correlated with a broad trend of more acceptance of a liberal rights ideology as indexed by a scale based on attitudes about civil liberties, racial tolerance, and sexual behavior. We construct a similar index to test whether the turnaround of the 1990s is also correlated with a broader change in ideology. We also include the standard self-reported measure of political conservatism and liberalism.

RESULTS

Figure 1 reports the means for each survey year in which at least three gender role attitudes were asked.
The End of the Gender Revolution

The figure also fits the observed means with the best fitting spline function that has a "knot" at 1994. After 1994, not only does the trend cease rising, it turns downwards. In results not reported here we tested for a second knot in the early 1980s as suggested by Brewster and Padavic; but once the knot at 1994 is included, there are no significant knots earlier.

----- Figure 1 about here -----

Next, we attempt to explain the observed curve both the rise in the 1970s and 1980s and the reversal in the 1990s with a series of controls. The logic here is that if a change in U.S. society accounted for the turnaround, then controlling for it should reduce the size of the "hinge" in the spline function. For instance, if the cohort replacement effect has slowed down, then cohort controls should explain not only the 1970s and 1980s liberal rise but also should eliminate or reduce the downward turn in 1994.

Table 1 reports tests for these factors. The first column shows the spline function coefficients that were illustrated in figure 1. The hinge coefficient (-0.046) is negative and significant; because the absolute value of the hinge coefficient is larger than the positive value for the main annual trend (+0.034), the results indicate that the trend since 1994 is negative (i.e., more conservative). Our goal in explaining the turnaround of the 1990s is to reduce the hinge coefficient to zero (i.e., non-significance).

----- Table 1 about here -----

Cohort controls. Column 2 shows the effects of controls for nine dummy variables for birth cohorts (births since 1975 is the omitted, comparison group). As other analyses have shown, cohort composition accounts for a substantial part of the positive linear trend in gender attitudes in the 1970s and 1980s. After cohort controls, the year coefficient (+0.019) is only 55% of its size before controls. Almost half of the change in the 1970s and 1980s is explained by the cohort controls.

However, only a small part (11%) of the reversal of the 1990s is explained by cohort controls. The spline coefficient is reduced, reflecting the slowing down of the cohort replacement effect in the 1990s, but the effect on the period reversal is not great. The turning point in 1994 is almost as dramatic after the cohort controls as before. And, except for the continued although milder liberalizing effect of cohort replacement, the conservative trend since 1994 would have been far more dramatic. That is, within cohorts, individuals have become considerably more
The End of the Gender Revolution

conservative since 1994. The implied slope since 1994 (−0.022) is 90% greater than before cohort controls (−0.012).

The cohort effect is itself not linear, as has been noticed before (Davis, 1992). The differences between each cohort before 1945 are quite large; after 1945 the differences become much more modest. There is no indication that the most recent cohorts are actually more conservative than the generation which pioneered the second wave of feminism. The trend continues to be for each new cohort to be slightly more liberal than the previous cohort, but the differences after 1945 are just much smaller.

This curvilinearity can be summarized in its own spline function with a hinge at births in 1945. Those results are reported in column 3. The period and period spline coefficients change little in this simpler model, and the variance explained differs little. We retain this simpler model in the analyses that follow because it is easier to observe the changes in the cohort trends.

An especially interesting result of this formulation is that the main cohort effect (+0.024) is larger than the main period effect (+0.018). During the rapid changes of the 1970s and 1980s, one year of difference in birth dates has a bigger impact on gender attitudes than another year of time. And after 1994, time actually makes most people more conservative, while the more recent cohorts are still more liberal than their predecessors. Of course, we will have to wait to see if those generations born in the 1990s maintain this same slow liberalizing cohort difference.

These period and cohort effects can best be seen in Figure 2. The dramatic cohort differences are especially obvious in this representation. Nevertheless, most cohorts show a liberalizing trend in the 1970s and 1980s, even if not as rapid as appeared in Figure 1 where the period changes included the cohort replacement effect. The conservative trends since 1994 are also evident for each of the cohorts since 1934 that is, for all cohorts who were under 60 before this turning point.

Some of these cohort effects may be a disguised age effect. The earliest cohorts, who are most conservative, were interviewed only in the early surveys (a conservative period) when they were already quite old. If aging also has a conservatizing effect on gender attitudes, the conservative nature of the early cohorts may be overstated. Separating these age, cohort, and period effects has a long and tortured history in social science. It is a difficult task because of the collinearities among the effects when all are entered into a model. This can be seen in
column 4 of Table 1 which includes controls for six age dummy variables (the oldest group over 75 is the omitted, comparison group). This model assigns some of the cohort effect to the age differences after middle age. That is, the size of the main cohort coefficient has been reduced by the age controls. The main period effect in the 1970s and 1980s also appears slightly stronger in this model because of the reduced cohort effect.

It is not our purpose here to provide a full exploration of the age, period, and cohort effects on gender attitudes. We urge some caution in the interpretation of column 4 since the results begin to become unstable when all six age variables are entered. What is important for our purposes is that the period spline coefficient \( B \) in the downturn in the 1990s is not much changed by the age controls. In fact, it is somewhat enhanced by the age controls. Thus, we still must look elsewhere for an explanation of the 1990s reversal.

**Social structural controls.** How much of the period (and cohort) changes can be explained by changes in the composition of the American public? Each new cohort had achieved more education than its predecessor and more education has been consistently linked with more liberal social attitudes in general and with progressive gender role attitudes in particular. Divorce rates had skyrocketed in the 1960s and 1970s so women seemed to need the protection of a job even if married. By the mid 1970s fertility rates had reached their nadir following the Baby Boom of the 1950s so family pressure on raising children may have abated. Some of these trends have ebbed in the last decade and so might account for the 1990s reversal in gender attitudes; the steady fertility rates since the mid 1970s means that the number of children in American households is no longer declining as it had done previously.

We test for the effects of these structural changes on the 1990s reversal in two steps. First in column 5, we add controls for education, religion, ethnicity, family income, and family structure and then in a second step, because of its special problems of endogeneity, add the control for whether there is a working woman in the family. All of these factors have their expected and now well documented impacts on gender attitudes, but none of these controls changes either period coefficient very much. The slope for 1974 to 1994 is +0.016, down only slightly from the +0.018 in model 3 without any structural controls. The hinge marking the downturn at 1994 actually increases slightly to -0.043 from -0.041 in model 3. So none of the changes in American public during the 1990s would have led us to expect the turnaround we observed in Figure 1.

The story is quite different for the cohort effects which are much more easily explained by the changes in
American society. The slope of the annual increase in the pre-1945 cohorts reduces by 40% to +0.014 after the controls. Increasing education is especially important in explaining the rising liberalism among these early cohorts. Perhaps even more interesting, the weakening of the cohort effect in the post 1945 cohorts is very obviously a result of the weakening of many of these structural changes in the post-1945 cohort. Education levels in particular stopped rising so rapidly in the post 1945 cohorts so the smaller changes in gender attitudes after the 1945 cohort should not be unexpected.1

Thus, the structural changes in American society had important effects on differences among cohorts. But little of the period effects, and almost none of the reversal of the 1990s, can be related to these structural changes.

**Ideological changes.** Our last possibility of explaining the attitude reversal of the 1990s is to look to the broader ideological climate that may have generally become more conservative in the 1990s. This would not so much "explain" the reversal in gender attitudes as change the nature of our search for explanations. If there was a general reversal of liberal ideology at the time, of which the change in gender attitudes was just a part, then we need to look to sources of this general pattern rather than to some specifically gender-based cultural changes.

The results of the controls for the rights ideology and the political conservatism scales are reported in column 7. Both ideology variables are strongly associated with gender attitudes, even after the controls for background factors. Like the social structural changes, the ideological changes help explain the cohort differences but have only modest abilities to explain the period effects. However, some small part of the reversal of the 1990s does appear to be related to a more general reversal of political ideology in the 1990s. The coefficient for the period spline changes from \(-0.043\) to \(-0.039\), about a 10% decline in absolute size. This is small, but it is about the only factor that has any explanatory power at all for the 1990s reversal.

---

1Some of the structural explanations of cohort differences are probably overstated since the changing gender attitudes of the recent generations undoubtedly affected their behavior as well: certainly some of the increase in women's labor force participation and perhaps even the changes in marriage and family formation are consequences not causes of the attitude differences.
In contrast, the rights ideology is closely associated with the cohort differences in gender attitudes. The post 1945 birth cohorts that favor more egalitarian gender roles are the same cohorts that favor a more liberal tolerant acceptance of social and political minorities. Change towards a more liberal ideology was rapid before 1945 but slower after World War II. Gender attitudes changed across cohorts along with these other changes in social ideology.

**DISCUSSION**

Changes in gender attitudes in the last three decades break into two distinct phases: a gradual liberalization that halted in the mid-1990s and then turned modestly more conservative in the years since. About half of the increase up until the mid 1990s was a cohort replacement effect with more recent, liberal, cohorts replacing earlier, more conservative, cohorts. After the 1945 birth cohort, the differences among cohorts became much smaller so recently the cohort replacement effect has lost some of its strength. This smaller cohort effects accounts for a small part of the post 1990s turnaround, but most of the 1990s turnaround is unexplained.

The cohort differences are easily understood compared to the period effects. More recent cohorts are better educated and this difference alone accounts for much of the differences in gender attitudes. More recent cohorts are generally more liberal on civil rights and social attitudes, although as for differences in gender attitudes, the post-1945 cohorts differ far less than the pre-war cohorts did. Thus, cohort differences in gender attitudes are best understood as part of this same pattern of growing but decelerating social liberalism among recent generations.

The period effects, however, are not well linked to changes in American social structure nor to broader changes in social ideology. Neither the period increases between the 1970s and the 1990s nor the reversal after the mid-1990s are associated closely with any other changes we can measure in the GSS. These period changes are specific to gender attitudes and do not reflect any underlying changes in the American population. For this reason, we suspect that the period changes in gender attitudes better reflect the popular agitations and trends in popular culture surrounding gender issues. This was Ferree's (1974) conclusion at the beginning of this period and it seems that the passage of time has only confirmed that interpretation.

What is still most difficult to understand is the timing of the mid-1990s reversal in gender attitudes. The
(second) women's movement rose in a great crescendo of cultural and structural changes during the 1970s. It would be only a slight exaggeration to say that feminism held the stage almost alone during that decade. There was opposition, of course, but it was less organized and less vocal more of a generalized inertia that only occasionally spoke publicly and then often only in a reactionary and discredited voice. So, the period attitude changes in the 1970s fit the events of the times.

But the 1970s were only a moment in the history of gender relations. By the 1980s organized opposition to feminism was better established, and the defeat of the ERA in 1983 announced that feminism was no longer an unchallengeable wave of the future. Cultural backlash was evident throughout the 1980s as Susan Faludi (1991) so thoroughly documented.

Nevertheless, neither public attitudes nor most structural changes showed any sign of reversal or even slowing down in the 1980s. Women, especially married mothers with young children continued to enter the labor force in ever growing numbers. They integrated previously male occupations, especially middle-class occupations, and narrowed the earnings gap with men more in the 1980s than in any other decade we have been able to measure. The most pressing question in understanding how basic structures like gender relations change is why it took over a decade of reaction before we could observe any real consequences of the backlash that Faludi described and was mobilized by the anti-ERA forces.

Change did finally come in the mid-1990s. As we have shown above, that reversal cannot be easily explained by any other changes in American society nor by broader shifts in the ideological "weather" of the times. The "Reagan Revolution" of the 1980s cannot be held directly responsible for the end of the gender revolution.

Perhaps rapid periods of change such as the gender revolution of the 1970s can only sustain themselves for short periods A kind of punctuated equilibrium theory of change in which stasis or slow generational change is the normal condition of social life. But we still need to identify what forces arose to hold back the wave of changes that seemed so dominant for a decade. Even if reaction is inevitable, it cannot be invisible.

More recent analyses of anti-feminist backlash have identified new themes in popular culture that might explain a 1990s reversal. But were these new themes quantitatively or qualitatively different from what Faludi described in the 1980s? One possibility is that the reaction of the 1990s adopted a new cultural frame to mobilize anti-
feminist forces that was more effective than the earlier more traditionalist resistance. During the 1970s and for much of the 1980s, the struggle was between two opposed ideologies that framed gender relations in either a progressive equality rhetoric or in a traditional, family values foundation.

What may have been distinct and effective in the 1990s was the emergence of a third cultural frame that proclaimed itself egalitarian and woman-centered but opposed the structural changes that would continue to move American society towards a more feminist future. According to this alternative rhetoric, equality meant the right of women to choose so choosing a stay-at-home mother role represented as much of a "feminist" choice as pursuing an independent career (Williams, 2000). If "traditional" roles could be defended without giving up on a generally egalitarian world view, part of the public could support traditional attitudes without identifying themselves with an outdated and unfair traditionalism.

The expansion of intensive mothering in the popular culture must also have put pressure on the public to find a way to support traditional gender roles without appearing sexist. The lack of an equal emphasis on intensive fathering could be overlooked in the interests of the children who (now?) faced such a competitive future that only a stay-at-home parent could prepare them for adequately.

We need to take a closer look at the popular culture of the 1990s to determine whether a new cultural frame did develop to support traditional gender roles while still appearing modern and egalitarian. Faludi was already alluding to such an emergence in the 1980s, but there may have been a quantitative growth in its spread that finally had its impact on the public.

These questions are more urgent because the public opinion trends documented above require more of an explanation than we have been able to provide with these data. Trends in gender attitudes did turn around in the 1990s in a way that can only be consistent with a period effect that had its origins outside the changing characteristics of the American public itself. Those outside changes need to be a central focus of current research.
REFERENCES
Bolzendahl, Catherine and Clem Brooks. 2005. A Polarization, Secularization, or Differences as Usual? The Denominational Cleavage in U.S. Social Attitudes Since the 1970s. @The Sociological Quarterly. 46:47-78.
Figure 1. Gender Role Attitudes by Survey Year.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Survey Year</strong></td>
<td>0.0343**</td>
<td>0.0188**</td>
<td>0.0179**</td>
<td>0.0227**</td>
<td>0.0166**</td>
<td>0.0160**</td>
<td>0.0169**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Survey Year Spline</strong></td>
<td>-0.0460**</td>
<td>-0.0410**</td>
<td>-0.0406**</td>
<td>-0.0432**</td>
<td>-0.0442**</td>
<td>-0.0434**</td>
<td>-0.0392**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohort: 1917-1885, 1894</strong></td>
<td>-1.2811</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohort: 1895-1904</strong></td>
<td>-1.2741</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohort: 1905-1914</strong></td>
<td>-1.1928</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohort: 1915-1924</strong></td>
<td>-0.8303</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohort: 1925-1934</strong></td>
<td>-0.6004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohort: 1935-1944</strong></td>
<td>-0.3984</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohort: 1945-1954</strong></td>
<td>-0.1667</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohort: 1955-1964</strong></td>
<td>-0.1245</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohort: 1965-1974</strong></td>
<td>-0.0692</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohort: Year of birth</strong></td>
<td>0.0243**</td>
<td>0.0175**</td>
<td>0.0166**</td>
<td>0.0144**</td>
<td>0.0096**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cohort: Year of birth spline (1945)</strong></td>
<td>-0.0167**</td>
<td>-0.0122**</td>
<td>-0.0071**</td>
<td>-0.0042**</td>
<td>-0.0009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age 18-24</strong></td>
<td>0.3908</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age 25-34</strong></td>
<td>0.3437</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age 35-44</strong></td>
<td>0.2865</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age 45-54</strong></td>
<td>0.2295</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age 55-64</strong></td>
<td>0.1755</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age 65-74</strong></td>
<td>0.0995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sex (male)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.2030**</td>
<td>-0.1539**</td>
<td>-0.1835**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race/Ethnicity: African American</strong></td>
<td>0.0818**</td>
<td>0.0652*</td>
<td>0.1239**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race/Ethnicity: Asian American</strong></td>
<td>-0.3641**</td>
<td>-0.3619**</td>
<td>-0.3195**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race/Ethnicity: Hispanic</strong></td>
<td>-0.1886**</td>
<td>-0.1928**</td>
<td>-0.0852**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education (years)</strong></td>
<td>0.0678**</td>
<td>0.0653**</td>
<td>0.0401**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion: Evangelicals</strong></td>
<td>-0.2468**</td>
<td>-0.2467**</td>
<td>-0.1277**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion: Baptist</strong></td>
<td>-0.0712+</td>
<td>-0.0676+</td>
<td>-0.1075**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion: Catholics</strong></td>
<td>0.0418*</td>
<td>0.0429*</td>
<td>-0.0354*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion: Jews</strong></td>
<td>0.1466**</td>
<td>0.1567**</td>
<td>0.0692</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion: Others</strong></td>
<td>-0.1913**</td>
<td>-0.1830**</td>
<td>-0.1196**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion: Non-affiliated</strong></td>
<td>0.0135</td>
<td>0.0183</td>
<td>-0.0613*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frequency of Religious Attendance</strong></td>
<td>-0.0479**</td>
<td>-0.0476**</td>
<td>-0.0220**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family income (log constant dollars)</strong></td>
<td>0.0582**</td>
<td>0.0448**</td>
<td>0.0318**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not married</strong></td>
<td>0.0443**</td>
<td>0.0836**</td>
<td>0.0456**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># children under 18</td>
<td>-0.0109*</td>
<td>-0.0046</td>
<td>0.0040</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Woman/wife in labor force</strong></td>
<td>0.2121***</td>
<td>0.3024***</td>
<td>0.3606***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Note:** Data from General Social Surveys, 1974-2004